

UKRAINIAN CENTER FOR INDEPENDENT POLITICAL RESEARCH
УКРАЇНСЬКИЙ НЕЗАЛЕЖНИЙ ЦЕНТР ПОЛІТИЧНИХ ДОСЛІДЖЕНЬ

Україна, 01034, Київ, вул. Лисенка, 8, оф. 9
Ukraine, 01034, Kyiv, Lysenka Str., 8 Suite 9
Tel./Fax: +380 279 24 35, +380 44 599 42 51
e-mail: ucipr@ucipr.kiev.ua, <http://www.ucipr.kiev.ua>



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RESUME

The 2010 presidential elections in Ukraine cannot solve the political conflict occurred in 2006-2007 after the change in the organization of political administration and growing aspirations to return to the linear administrative and subordinated influence in politics and economics. A configuration of the alignment of forces within the system of political decision-making, which will emerge after the elections, might become a catalyst of new conflicts with the use of means of destruction in the system of government institutions. And the campaign itself is attended with the active use of corruption methods.

The modern political conflict is grounded on the “winner-take-all” behavior meaning the absolute advantage of one of political forces in the distribution of resources and in decision-making. Such approaches in political tactics experience institutional changes launched during the election and political reform and providing for forced consensus in political decision-making in the interests of the wide circle of stakeholders.

Since a would-be winner in the presidential race prioritizes, first of all the, the consolidation of power for the legislative and structural support of his/her own vision on changes in the country, there is a possibility that the Head of State might initiate a political system reform. In the period right after the elections, the consolidation objective will mean efforts to affect a format of the parliamentary majority, which, under the Constitution of Ukraine, is shaped as the pro-government coalition. At the same time, parliamentary processes are based on the non-public sporadic formation of the two main possible schemes of the would-be majority configuration: both the pro-governmental and pro-presidential. And groups of collaborators for the future lines of the political cycle are being selected. The course of developments will depend upon an approach, which political forces will use as a basis for their tactics: problems of the configuration of power will be solved depending on whether these forces will use the infrastructure and channels of the political system based on the 2004 Constitution or will attempt to change the Basic Law and on whether they will use means of dialogue or pressure for this.

The political confrontation in parliament and the low level of cooperation of political institutions – all these together by no means encourage the proper level of legislative activities. Law-makers postpone decisions on the most important issues of economic development, thus failing to create incentives for the business, impeding the formation and strengthening of property relations and anti-corruption policy. Some legislative proposals are aimed at the market administration. MPs work with bills inattentively, which delays the effect of some rules of law.

The main risk of 2010 for the national economy is the stability that will emerge as a result of backstage accords of political forces capable to “collect” 300 votes in the Verkhovna Rada to “conserve” the situation. Tactical differences between the key political forces (in such issues as the status of private property, freedom of entrepreneurship, tax reform and land) will be put to the background for the sake of a common strategic goal – to retain their positions.

As for guarantees of the property right protection, agreements could be useful, which would be formalized in laws later.

There is a possibility that high state officials will continue to support some large export-oriented enterprises, which however will not mean a transparent policy of public-private partnership.

Having tax reform concepts in their arsenal, the key presidential candidates failed to make them important parts of their platforms. This evidences political forces pay little attention to the taxation and regulatory policy reforms. What the draft Tax Code developed by Yanukovych's second government and the Tax Reform Strategy approved by Tymoshenko's Cabinet have in common is the absence of ideology of radical changes in the tax administration system and the liberalization of the taxation system as such. Political forces also attempt to keep silence about the radical market deregulation. This may be grounds, on which the two political forces will find a compromise on the tax reform and the regulatory policy. Most likely, the deficient tax system and the absence of a clear regulatory policy will pose serious risks for the business in Ukraine in the medium-term period.

Experts expect the land issue will remain one of the "eternal topics" in public activities of political forces and a means to mobilize their voters. Even given the adoption of necessary laws, the moratorium on the sale of agricultural lands will not be abolished in the near future. This means investment in land will remain extremely risky.

In the short-term period (at least, until 1 April, 2010), experts forecast difficulties in administration of public finance, decrease of expenditures at a variety of levels due to the absence of the national budget law, which might entail the decline of purchasing power of population given increasing inflation in the first quarter of 2010. The medium-term period (until July 2010) will be marked with influences of political agreements concerning personnel changes on the system of public administration at different levels.

Despite expectations of a decrease in the cost-of-living, no protest actions on this ground are predicted.

The medium- and long-term forecast of changes in factors of political instability or reduction of their impact is unfavorable.

THE POLITICAL PROCESS

A. Political corruption in the election campaign and its impact on the legitimacy of authorities

According to forecasts presented in the previous Document on Political Risk Assessment (Issue 3, Impact of Political Corruption on the Political Process, October 2009), the election campaign is mostly based on relations of political corruption.

The authors use ***the notion of political corruption for illegitimate (illegal) exchange of resources with groups of influence to gain personal power advantages and influences, which erodes the fundamentals of democracy and the legitimacy of its institutions and damages interests of the society.***

Data of the expert survey (see the enclosed survey on “Impact of the Presidential Campaign in Ukraine on the Political Stability. Assessment of Corruption in Elections”) prove the most widespread corruption methods applied during the elections incorporate direct and indirect bribery of voters (76% of respondents), use of budget (public) funds for the campaign (71%) and bribery of the media’s influence on the information space (71%). At the same time, experts unanimously state ***the share of the administrative interference into the election process constituted about ¼ (23.8%) of factors affecting the course of elections, which was mostly determined by various political influences on the executive vertical.***

Experts pointed out different corruption methods were applied mostly by teams of political forces, whose campaigns were the most successful. Taking the above opinion into account, it is possible to speak about the spread and efficiency of corruption techniques from the viewpoint of their application and negative impact on the process of power legalization, when the political system is grounded on the recognition of its corruption basis. Consequently, ***the corruption basis will create a number of negative factors in the exercise of power in the future.***

A closest in time consequence will be ***the reduction of social payments*** due to the need to repay election expenses, since recipients of corruption favors were strata of population sensitive to them. Under the 9 October, 2009 Cabinet resolution “On the Approval of the Temporary Procedure for the Commissioning of Finished Private Country Houses, Cottages and Garden Cottages Equipped with facilities and Constructions Built without the Building Permit”, such social groups include the rural voters (specifically, *groups of landowners*, who had an opportunity to get land property documents for free), *owners of finished private country houses, cottages and garden cottages equipped with facilities and constructions built without the building permit, leadership of local self-government bodies at the level of chairmen of village and settlement councils* that shapes electoral sentiments due to an increase in their material and financial position (in compliance with the 27 May, 2009 Cabinet resolution providing for a 50% increase of salaries of these officials and in accordance with the 23 May, 2009 Cabinet resolution providing for the introduction of positions of accountants and legal advisers, the number of executive officers considerably increases).

The voters, who cannot influence decision-making on the distribution of offices but simultaneously need attention, e.g. people in line for housing aid, leadership and employers of budget-funded institutions (hospitals, schools, cultural establishments etc.) and who get

property for the exercise of functions directly from presidential candidates, are politically active and, at the same time, sensitive to the exchange of political influence for benefits.

For the first time, the Ukrainian population publically initiated political corruption. Representatives of some social groups confirmed their readiness for illegitimate exchange during the elections. They voluntarily agreed to sell their votes, as the media reported.

The remote and long-lasting effect from corruption exchange of political rights for material benefits will be ***the creation of preconditions for politicians' disregard of interests of the "sellers" of the electoral right and their participation in the public administration as well as legitimated opportunities to abuse power.***

B. The election process and its procedures

Passions run high over the non-recognition of the election results by the team of one of the candidates and the early termination of parliamentary powers in 2010.

To what extent is this scenario possible?

Opinions of experts on **the non-recognition of the results of voting in the second round differ**. In general, a fewer number of respondents believe the results of voting in the second round might be declared invalid: the question "Whether you see an opportunity for declaring the results of the repeat voting on 7 February, 2010 invalid?" was answered positively and negatively by 9 (42.8%) and 12 (57%) pollsters respectively.

Those, who gave the positive answer, say the very possibility of the disruption of the repeat voting due to an emergency and the impossibility to determine the results of the vote because of numerous electoral frauds (55% and 44% respectively) are the most probable reasons to declare the elections invalid. Speculations on differences in exit poll data are forecasted as well. Experts consider the non-recognition of the vote results as a part of strategies of candidates. Hence, the worst scenario, according to pollsters, is the breakdown of the election results on 7 February.

In the opinion of the authors, **a possibility of declaring the results of the second round invalid is low provided that subjects of the electoral process comply with the law. Yet, the entry of agents of electoral subjects into coercive schemes potentially capable of destroying the very structural basis for the work of election institutions cannot be ruled out.**

Procedures of the 5 March, 1999 law "On the Elections of the President of Ukraine" with amendments do not rule for the recognition of the elections invalid. Article 80 governs, "A polling station election commission may declare the vote in the election precinct invalid, if it reveals violations of the requirements of this Law, as a result of which it is impossible to determine the result of the expressed will of the voters with certainty. The polling station election commission may only declare the vote in the election precinct invalid if the following circumstances exist: 1) if the amount of cases of illegal voting (if a person cast the election ballot in the ballot box on behalf of another voter, except for the cases envisaged by this law; voting by persons, who have no right to vote; voting by persons, who are not included in the list of voters in the election precinct or who are included in the list without legal ground; voting more than once by the same person) exceeds 10% of the number of voters, who took part in the vote in the election precinct; 2) if ballots in the ballot boxes are discovered in an amount that by more than 10% exceeds the number of voters, who took part in the vote in the election precinct; 3) if the

ballot box (boxes) are destroyed or damaged in a way that makes it impossible to determine the content of the election ballots, and the amount of these ballots by more than 10% exceeds the number of voters, who took part in the vote in the election precinct.

According to Article 83 of the law, “The territorial election commission shall determine the results of the vote within the territorial election district no later than on the fifth day from the day of the elections irrespective of the number of polling stations in this district.” *It is prohibited to declare the elections invalid within the boundaries of the territorial election district.*

Also, the law procedures do not envisage the situation, under which the elections shall be declared as such that did not take place – there is no presence threshold for either the voting day or the day of repeat voting.

However, the repeat elections of the President of Ukraine shall be conducted if no more than two candidates for the post of the President of Ukraine were included in the election ballot for voting and neither of them has been elected and if all candidates for the office of the President of Ukraine, who were included in the election ballot, have resigned prior to the day of elections or prior to the day of repeat voting (Article 15). Repeat elections of the President of Ukraine shall take place on the last Sunday of the ninety-day term from the day the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the resolution on calling the repeat elections (Article 17).

The election process, as always, highlights **failings in the legislative and normative basis for different aspects of the organization of a system of power**. As for the current campaign, attention was drawn to the procedure for the designation of judges to administrative offices in connection with the situation around the status of the Chairman of the High Administrative Court of Ukraine, the instance considering electoral disputes.

According to different sources, the term of office of the Chairman of the High Administrative Court of Ukraine (HACU) expired on 22 December, 2009. The next day, his First Deputy appointed himself the HACU acting Chairman. Yet another official seal was made by his submission, as he stated the first one had disappeared. Later on, following the protest of the Attorney General, the second official seal was withdrawn and the permission for its issue was canceled.

This conflict occurred due to the deficient legislative basis for procedural aspects, in particular, the organizational ones that could be used in political interests. For the time being, judges are appointed to administrative offices following the temporary procedure approved by the Verkhovna Rada in the implementation of the judgment by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine of 16 May, 2007, under which all decisions on the designation and dismissal of judges shall be made by the High Council of Justice of Ukraine as an independent constitutional body.

Battles around the status of the Chairman of the High Administrative Court of Ukraine and the involvement of law-enforcement officers in the situation with the Ukraine Printing Plant (its new management is rumored to fulfill orders to print more ballots than it is needed) evidence **some political actors are interested in the destabilization of the election process using loopholes in the law**. There is a possibility that these circumstances might be used in disputing the election results.

C. The post-election process

Trends of reformatting interests within a political system

After the elections are conducted successfully and legally, their results are determined and a new President takes an oath, he/she will face **the problem of power consolidation**.

Even during the campaign, representatives of different political forces have repeatedly raised the issue of **a possibility of the early termination of powers of the Verkhovna Rada**, since a format of the exercise of power provides for the central role of the majority coalition in shaping the government and formulating its policy.

This was stated by President Victor Yushchenko on 11 January, 2009. He said, "The parliamentary elections will probably be conducted because any force, which might come to power, would like to consolidate through parliament. I guess Tymoshenko has such the scenario as she wants to reshuffle parliament. Yanukovych definitely supports this scenario like any other third force, including mine." "It is because parliament needs to be reshuffled," the President added.

Presidential candidate and leader of the Party of Regions Victor Yanukovych, who got the highest result of 35.3% of votes, does not rule out such a possibility. "I want this Verkhovna Rada to consolidate around my platform. I will propose this. If this does not happen, early parliamentary elections will take place in May," he said on 24 January.

In her turn, presidential candidate PM Yulia Tymoshenko is also sure a pro-presidential majority will be formed after her victory in the elections (she received 20.05% of votes in the first round). As a matter of fact, Y. Tymoshenko is in a more advantageous position from the viewpoint of political tactics. In case of a victory of V. Yanukovych, he should find "his" pro-presidential majority (even unformalized one and a formalized needed for "his" Cabinet), whereas in case of a victory of Y. Tymoshenko, she already has the formalized pro-governmental coalition composed of factions of BYuT, Lytvyn Bloc and OUPSD and the ready Cabinet with a vacant position of the Prime Minister (under Article 103 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the President shall not have another representative mandate and hold office in national authorities). All she will have to do is to fill vacancies of the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Transport (open since June 2009) and the Minister of Finance (open since February 2009).

However, it is possible to expect that for a certain time, there will be a temptation to freely interpret (and only then to apply to the Constitutional Court) the rule of the Basic Law reading, "The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine <...> resigned by the Verkhovna Rada shall perform its duties unless a new Cabinet starts to work" (Article 85), whereas the Cabinet shall be resigned as a result of the resignation of the prime Minister. The above rule is probably interpreted as an opportunity to hold two offices a new Cabinet is formed.

A possible scenario of events in case of Tymoshenko's victory might imply the procedurally correct substitution of the vacant office of the Prime Minister (the First Vice PM can perform functions of the Head of the government for some time) on the proposal of the formalized coalition of deputy factions.

Yanukovych's victory in the elections will force him to implement most tasks: to shape a pro-presidential majority (that does not exist today) at the minimum and to dismiss Tymoshenko's Cabinet at the maximum. Difficulties linked to the performance of these tasks might urge his partners to make a compromise with the existing pro-government majority and the Cabinet. **A possibility of the creation of a stable majority, which would be pro-governmental**

and pro-presidential from the tactical viewpoint, is high. The above possibility was not excluded by leader of parliamentary faction of 172 votes and presidential candidate V. Yanukovych. On 24 November, 2009, he mentioned a possibility to shape, after the elections, a parliamentary coalition of the Party of Regions and BYuT. "It is quite possible, everything is possible. Though in case of a coalition of the PR and BYuT, the Prime Minister will be appointed from members of the Party of Regions, i.e. from the largest faction," the politician stated. (BYuT faction has 153 members, OUPSD – 71 and Lytvyn Bloc – 20. However, not all MPs from pro-governmental factions are the coalition members).

An opposite option is the artificial destabilization of the work of parliament so that to create legal grounds for the early termination of its powers.

According to expert assessments (see data of the survey on "Impact of the Presidential Campaign in Ukraine on the Political Stability. Assessment of Corruption in Elections"), the overwhelming majority of respondents (17 persons or 80.9%) are sure **the political situation might change after the elections, which will give grounds for the early termination of powers of the Verkhovna Rada and for the special parliamentary elections.** 15 out of the above 17 experts (88% out of 80.9% of those, who believe it is possible in 2010, or 71% of the total number) are certain **the disintegration of the current coalition and a failure to create a new one** will be a legal reason for the early termination of powers of the Verkhovna Rada. Approximately 1/3 of pollsters (41% of those, who believe the early termination of powers of the Verkhovna Rada is possible, or 30% of the total number) guess **parliament will not be able to form the government through the dismissal of the acting Cabinet.** Pollsters do not rule out a possibility of **the blocking of parliamentary sessions to prevent their beginning within 30 days** though a possibility of this scenario was stated only by 4 respondents or 23% of those, who think the dissolution of parliament is possible in 2010, or 5% of the total number of the polled experts. Hence, **on the issue of legal grounds for the termination of parliamentary powers, most pollsters (71%) are inclined to think this might occur as a result of a failure to set up a new coalition in the Verkhovna Rada.**

MPs do not welcome the special elections idea. It is interpreted as a desire of extra-parliamentary political forces to get deputy mandates and to acquire or retain their positions in active public policy. Specifically, Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn said on 22 January, 2010, "The process of destabilizing the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is under way. As many people will be demobilized, they will have to look for job, which they could find nowhere else but the Verkhovna Rada. And it depends on us to do our best to resume the work of parliament and to renew its trust in people. Otherwise, the situation in the country will be extremely difficult."

Representatives of political forces, who view a new parliament as the reduction of personal opportunities, are against the idea of the special parliamentary elections as well.

As for **the time frame** for the potential termination of parliament powers, it is possible to state that **the special parliamentary elections might be held this fall, if any. There are no political and legal reasons to discuss the early termination of powers of the Verkhovna Rada as of now. Yet, the very factor of constant talks about the "dispersal" of parliament gives no additional confidence to either political actors or economic entities or Ukraine's partners.**

Meanwhile, groups are being formed in parliament under political courses of the future alignment of forces.

Depending on the election results, all the key actors will look for approaches to the further development of the political situation from the viewpoint of political and economic benefits and expenses. Most likely, the center of political decision-making will remain in parliament characterized by multi-vectoral (non-factional) and mostly backstage influences (therefore, not all its political decisions can be predicted). Hopes of presidential candidates for their own leading role in the process of changing the system and format of power as well as in the area of the personnel policy do not have enough constitutional and political grounds.

THE PARLIAMENTARY PROCESS

A. The work of parliament under the absence of strategic documents on the national development and the organization of the work of the legislature

The current parliamentary business and, consequently, the forecast of directions of policies in different areas is complicated by **the absence of fundamental documents that could serve as a basis for the legislative process – the Regulations of the Verkhovna Rada, the Cabinet Action Program and the law on the national budget.**

1. Under Article 83 of the Constitution of Ukraine, “Rules on the conduct of work of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall be laid down in the Constitution of Ukraine and the Regulations of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.” “The Head of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine exercises powers as specified in the Constitution, in compliance with the procedure set out in the Regulations of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine” (Article 88). “Frameworks for forming, organizing, and terminating activities of a coalition of parliamentary factions in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall be established by the Constitution of Ukraine and the Regulations of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine” (Article 83).

Meanwhile, ***the Regulations of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of 19 September, 2008 lost its validity*** following the judgment by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine of ***26 November, 2009*** recognizing it as unconstitutional.

On 22 October, 2009, the Verkhovna Rada passed the law “On the Organization and Functioning of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine”. On 6 November, 2009, the President returned the law with respective proposals considered by parliament on 1 December, 2009. After that, 384 MPs voted to overrun the presidential veto and to repeatedly pass the law. On 2 December, 2009, the document was sent for signature by the President. Since the President returned the document without his signature on 11 December, 2009, the law was issued on 1 December, 2009 over the signature of the Head of parliament (“Where a law, during its repeated consideration, receives votes of no less than 2/3 of the constitutional membership of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and in the event, the President of Ukraine does not sign and officially promulgate such a law, it shall be without delay signed and officially promulgated by the Head of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and published over his/her signature.”)

The law “On the Organization and Functioning of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine” of 1 December, 2009 reads, “The organization and functioning of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall be established by the Constitution of Ukraine, the law on the status of people’s deputies of Ukraine, the law on committees of the Verkhovna Rada, the law on temporary special and investigatory commissions of the Verkhovna Rada, other laws of Ukraine and the Verkhovna

Rada Regulations. The Verkhovna Rada shall work in compliance with the Constitution of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada Regulations. Under the Constitution of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall pass its Regulations, a special act setting parliamentary rules and procedures for the exercise of constitutional powers by the Verkhovna Rada in the implementation of its legal, control, statutory or other function.”

Organizational and procedural issues of the work of parliament have been improved (since 8 July, 2009, changes in procedures for holding the Cabinet sessions and decision-making have been introduced to the Cabinet Regulations of 18 July, 2007), whereas **parliament has been working for two month without its Regulations, which calls procedural aspects of parliamentary decision-making in question.**

2. The Cabinet Action Program “Ukrainian Breakthrough: for People, not Politicians” was approved by the Cabinet resolution of 16 January, 2008. Since that time, it has been **neither revised nor adjusted according to changes in socio-economic processes in Ukraine.**

The Verkhovna Rada also failed to approve the Cabinet Action Program despite it was provided for by the 16 January, 2008 Cabinet resolution and the Constitution of Ukraine.

3. The post-election period might also be marked by the reduction of budget expenditures either in connection with the need to cover budget and extra-budget (private) spending of electoral subjects incurred by their agents during the campaign or in connection with **the absence of the approved law on the national budget for 2010.**

Ukraine has once lived without the approved budget law for six months. The Verkhovna Rada approved the law only on 27 June, 1997. The document came into force in a month and a half by the law “On the Enactment of the law “On the National Budget of Ukraine” on 15 August, 1997.

Unless the 2010 budget is approved, national authorities are authorized to spend budget funds in compliance with Article 46 of the Budget Code imposing the following restrictions:

1. “Taxes, duties, mandatory payments and other receipts shall be collected under the law on the national budget of Ukraine for the previous budget period and other normative and legislative acts.
2. National budget spending shall be made only for purposes set in the law on the national budget of Ukraine for the previous budget period, which are also included in the draft law on the national budget of Ukraine for the relevant budget period submitted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.
3. Monthly national budget expenditures shall not exceed 1/12 of the amount defined by the law on the national budget of Ukraine for the previous budget period (except for expenditures meant to repay debt-related liabilities that shall be carried out according to contracts and other regulations and legal acts, which lead to entering into debt liabilities of the state, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or local self-government, regardless of the amount of resources allocated for such purposed in the law on the national budget of Ukraine or the local budget decision; and special fund expenditures of the budget: they have a permanent budget appropriation authorizing expenditures only within available revenues and at the expense of the respective special fund in accordance with the law, unless otherwise stated by the law on the national budget of Ukraine or a budget decision of a local council).

4. Capital expenditures shall be prohibited unless the national budget for the current year is adopted, except for cases relating to the declaration of the martial law or national emergency or the proclamation of some localities as zones of ecological emergency; expenses for the capitalization of banking institutions and expenses from the Stabilization Fund (this provision shall be in force until 1 January, 2011, if after the expiration of the term, the law “On Immediate Actions to Prevent Negative Consequences of Financial Crisis and Amendments to Some Legal Acts of Ukraine” of 31 October, 2008 is not extended).
5. Unless the law on the national budget of Ukraine for the current budget period is adopted, funds can be borrowed only to cover the main amount of the national debt, save expenses for the capitalization of banking institutions and expenses from the Stabilization Fund (this provision shall be in force until 1 January, 2011, if after the expiration of the term, the law “On Immediate Actions to Prevent Negative Consequences of Financial Crisis and Amendments to Some Legal Acts of Ukraine” of 31 October, 2008 is not extended).”

As seen from the above expert of the Budget Code, unless the current budget is approved, only current expenditures of authorities are funded that shall not exceed 1/12 of the amount defined by the law on the national budget of Ukraine for the previous budget period. Capital expenditures are not provided for.

With regard to the nominal growth of the minimum wages and salaries rate, it is possible to forecast ***the reduction of various social security payments and bonuses*** approved in compliance with changes to the law “On the National Budget of Ukraine for 2009” made by the law “On Setting the Cost-of-Living and Minimum Wages (Salaries)”.

According to the these documents, the cost-of-living is set in the amount of UAH 701 per month since 1 November, 2009, UAH 825 – since 1 January, 2010, UAH 839 – since 1 April, UAH 843 – since 1 July, UAH 861 – since 1 October and UAH 875 – since 1 December.

Minimum monthly wages and salaries are set in the amount of UAH 744 since 1 November, 2009, UAH 869 – since 1 January, 2010, UAH 884 – since 1 April, UAH 888 – since 1 July, UAH 907 – since 1 October and UAH 922 –since 1 December.

As the government and parliament have different opinions on the amount of minimum wages (salaries) for 2010, a political discussion is possible on this issue.

The duration of the period of a possible reduction of social security payments by different programs as well as financial tools to be used to overcome this situation is seen from the law on the national budget. PM Yulia Tymoshenko admitted the law on the national budget for 2010 and the Budget Code will be adopted in the second half of February 2010.

Experts polled by the UCIPR deem there is a slight chance that the law on the national budget will be approved before the beginning of the 2nd quarter of 2010: 90.4% against 9.6% of respondents.

For the time being, the absence of a legal framework for the budget process enables the government to “manually” administer budget funds and represents one of the factors of administrative risks.

B. The legislative process

Close attention to the course of political struggle, the absence of strategic documents on national development as a basis for the work of the legislature and the low level of cooperation of political institutions (the President-parliament-the government) either at the level of personal communication or at the institutional level cause the lack of attention to the content of law-making, thus **making it deficient**. In its turn, in the economic area, this results in **the administrative interference with market mechanisms, the absence of a market for agricultural lands and shadow transactions with land**.

Monitoring of legislative activity within October 2009-January 2010 proves **positions of groups, treating market processes in an arbitrary manner** and thereby demonstrating “their concern over socially insecure and vulnerable strata of the population”, **are strong** in the Verkhovna Rada. In this respect, the approval of the bill “On the Moratorium on the Increase of Prices and Tariffs for Medical Drugs and Medical Products” on 20 October, 2009 by 242 votes is indicative. The bill drafted by MPs from the CPU P. Symonenko and V. Matveev provides “to declare, for the period of the crisis, a moratorium on the increase of prices for all Ukrainian and foreign medical drugs and products unless the amount of minimum wages, salaries and pensions is set at the level of the living minimum and unless arrears of wages, salaries, scholarships and grants for students and schoolchildren are repaid. Ukrainian medications shall be sold at prices regulated by the government, while imported medical drugs and products shall be sold at prices fixed as of 1 July, 2008” (Article 1). How authorities interpret the financial crisis and its end is the topic for another discussion. However, the administrative regulation of prices does not coincide with market rules and Article 191 of the Economic Code of Ukraine reading, “When setting fixed prices resulting in a failure of business to get profit, executive power and local self-government bodies shall grant an allowance to such businesses.” The Verkhovna Rada lacked 300 votes to overrun the presidential veto on the law. Returning it to parliament, the President noted such the law “is economically unsubstantiated and might be fraught with some negative socio-economic consequences. Specifically, some medications might be withdrawn from sale, false drugs and medications might come into the market and the number of smuggled imported drugs might grow.”

Deserving of special mention is the episode with the enactment of the main anti-corruption law “On Principles of Preventing and Combating Corruption” as well as the laws “On Responsibility of Legal Entities for Committing Corruption Offenses” and “On Amending Some Legal Acts of Ukraine on “Responsibility for Committing Corruption Offenses” approved on 11 June 2009. This time, due to **the absence of the proper examination of bills**, the law will come into force on 1 April, 2010 instead of 1 January. The respective decision had been made a week before the law would have entered into effect, on 23 December, 2009, and the President supported changes to it. Deficient rules of the document served as a reason for the postponement of its enactment. Yet, instead of amending its rules, the law was simply delayed.

In the address to the President of Ukraine of 24 December, 2009, Government Commissioner on Anti-Corruption Policy Y. Sukhov stated, “The delayed enactment of the anti-corruption package definitely seems to be the deliberate delay of the legal regulation of the anti-corruption policy and is directly linked to the unwillingness to apply the effective anti-corruption law. There were no reasons for this decision. The delayed enactment of the anti-corruption package will destroy Ukraine’s image on the international scene, give grounds for a failure to meet the GRECO recommendations, reduce the country’s position in the Corruption Perception Index

2010 and enter Ukraine in the FATF black list, which in its turn will cause the outflow of foreign investment.”

The postponement of the application of anti-corruption laws erodes Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts. In this context, it has to be mentioned that the anti-corruption policy needs closer attention of law-makers and government institutions. Despite an important step – the approval of *the Procedure for Making the Anti-Corruption Examination of Legislative and Normative Acts* by the Cabinet resolution on 16 September, 2009 – *a methodology for such examination is still absent*. Also, *the text of the Anti-Corruption Strategy*, the approval of which was made public by the Cabinet on 8 December, 2009, *has not been published yet*.

On 22 December, 2009, the Verkhovna Rada prolonged **the moratorium on the sale of land valid since 2001 until 1 January 2012**. 344 MPs voted for changes in the law “On Amending Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Section X “Transitional Provisions” of the Land Code of Ukraine on the Term for the Sale of Lands”. The law rules that prior to the coming into force of the laws on the National Land Cadastre and on the land market but not later than 2012, the prohibition shall be imposed on: the sale-purchase of state-owned and communal agricultural lands, save their confiscation (redemption) for social needs; the sale-purchase or other means of transfer of land plots and a change in the purpose use of lands owned by natural persons and legal entities engaged in commodity agriculture, lands allocated in kind to owners of land shares, save lands left by testament, exchange of land plots for other lands in compliance with the law and the confiscation (redemption) of lands for social needs. Under the law, the sale-purchase or other means of transfer of such land plots and land shares shall be applied provided that the laws on the National Land Cadastre and on the land market have come into effect but not later than 1 January, 2012 and that specific features of the circulation of state-owned, communal and agricultural lands have been determined.

It has to be mentioned that MPs overrode the presidential veto on this document by 366 (the Party of Regions – 151 votes, BYuT – 151, OUPSD – 16, the CPU – 27, Lytvyn Bloc – 20, non-partisan deputies – 1) out of 426 votes.

In late 2004, President Leonid Kuchma signed the law “On Amending the Land Code of Ukraine” prolonging the moratorium on the sale of agricultural lands until 1 January, 2007. In November 2005, President Victor Yushchenko ordered the Cabinet of Ministers to develop a Concept of the formation and development of the land market. Yet, the situation with putting lands into market circulation remains unregulated. PM Yulia Tymoshenko said in December 2007, “We will prolong the moratorium (on the sale of land) unless we develop a normal legislative basis for this process and shape a normal market. It is impossible to abolish the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land, if almost no necessary law on the land market has been passed. Why shall we make the land a commodity? To buy it up, excuse me, for nothing as it happened once to vouchers and then to sell it on the secondary market for billions? There is no land market, it is not yet shaped.” “On the other hand, the shadow market for agricultural land does exist; agricultural lands are exchanged and sold in the shadow. It is needed to pass, as soon as possible, all the laws on the land market but the land shall be the property of Ukrainians, who live and work on it,” the Head of the government stressed.

The issue of the law regulating the land market has been pending for over 10 years in Ukraine. See the impact of this problem on the business climate in the Section “The Economic Process. D. The land issue”

THE ECONOMIC PROCESS

Main political risks in the economic area represent three behavioral models. The first one can be conditionally defined as “liberal” though it includes social democratic elements. The second is designed to serve interests of the large capital (the Party of Regions) and the third model adheres to principles of the governance of the economy (BYuT). Practice proves except for the protection of interests of their members, other parties (the Communist Party and the People’s Party) respond to the situation accordingly and actively use populist mottos.

A. The property right (privatization and re-privatization)

As is known, the property right in Ukraine is legally guaranteed by the Constitution and entrenched in the Civil Code. The status of property acquired during privatization may be changed in case of a failure to pay money for a privatized object or to meet investment liabilities. The confiscation of property may be applied only pursuant to a court decision.

Positions of political forces on guarantees of the property right (privatization and re-privatization) can be brought to the following two.

The first one (BYuT) provides for an opportunity to regulate the property right according to the principle of political expediency. This means to keep owners uncertain as to the future of their investments. Such the state of affairs makes investors look for ways to show loyalty to political forces, which influence decision-making on their future.

As a matter of fact, as foreign investors are concerned, they appeal to court (Vanco Prykerchenska Ltd.), curtail their business in the country (CBM Oil plc, Shelton and Marathon) or ask help from governments of their states that protect them against arbitrary decisions by Ukrainian officials.

Ukrainian owners are in a more difficult situation. Say, the liquidation of gambling in May 2009, made at the instigation of BYuT following the simplified procedure and without public discussion, clearly signaled the Ukrainian business that no property owner can feel safe. And a bill regulating this activity that would have to be drafted and approved within three months has never come into force.

Raider attacks, possible due to the weak law and judicial system, pose a serious threat to the property.

The second position (supported by some members of the PR and liberal MPs from OUPSD) provides for more respect for the private property, at least, at the level of public assurances.

Over the period of his presidency, Victor Yushchenko has repeatedly come out for legal guarantees to the business and the protection of property rights. Specifically, it was he, who stopped the “re-privatization fever” in 2005. His decree No. 1648 of 24 November, 2005 put into force the 29 June resolution by the NSDC on actions to improve the investment climate in Ukraine and the 28 October resolution by the NSDC on actions to set guarantees and to enhance the effectiveness of guarantees of the protection of the property right in Ukraine. Yet, the President failed to create reliable and effective mechanisms for the property right protection.

The PR advocates the large capital and the former is not only disinterested in the re-distribution of the private property and re-privatization shocks but is also ready to participate in privatization of such state-owned enterprises as the Odesa Port Plant, Ukrtelecom, ports, Ukrzaliznytsya etc. With regard to the fact that Yanukovych’s governments prioritized the

further concentration and centralization of the capital, this process has to be expected to remain in the focus of his attention.

There are reasons to believe guarantees of the property right in Ukraine will continue to strongly depend on the political situation, while risks linked to the illegitimate loss of property will remain high enough.

At best, owners may count on the retention of the status quo concerning property rights, legal protection and reimbursement of investment.

B. The freedom of entrepreneurship (business climate)

Despite that the freedom of entrepreneurship in Ukraine is entrenched by rules of direct action, Ukraine's overall standing on the ease of doing business has not improved: it is ranked 145th out of 181 countries reviewed in the Doing Business-2009 report by the World Bank.

Under unfavorable business climate, it is the large capital that has the best opportunities to protect itself because it not only has representation in the political and administrative elites but also formulates the legislation.

In view of practical activities of the main political forces representing the overwhelming majority of voters, it has to be expected that attention of these forces will continue to be focused on problems of the large business. This will mean the budget and legal support to big companies, lobbying for privileges to some industries and large enterprises and preferential treatment for their development.

In the course of the presidential campaign, on 4 November, 2009, parliament adopted the bill No. 5235 "On Amending Some Laws of Ukraine on Promoting Entrepreneurship" of 16 October, 2009 at the first reading. Specifically, the bill simplifies the procedure for the start-up of the business, provides for the principle of "tacit consent" in the registration process, additionally restricts the number of inspections, licenses, permissive documents and certificates, reduces the time needed for the issue of permissive documents etc.

Special attention shall be paid to the fact that the key provisions of the bill coincide with election platforms of V. Yushchenko, A. Hrytsenko, S. Tihipko and others. The approval of the document at the first reading and a considerable percentage of votes the above persons won together at the 17 January elections evidence this position is backed up by both Ukrainian politicians and the society.

Yet, this bill remains almost the only signal to the society and the business about the ease of doing business in the country. Under the absence of the national budget bill because of political expediency, there is a high possibility that the draft law "On Amending Some Laws of Ukraine on Promoting Entrepreneurship" will not be soon adopted. The question as to what officials from the Presidential Administration will lobby the accelerated approval of the positive for the small and medium business bill remains open as well.

Meanwhile, practical activities of Yanukovich's government prove it does not prioritize solutions to problems of this economic sector. Small domestic-consumption-oriented businesses remained out of attention of Cabinets he headed. This is evidenced, in particular, by the dissolution of the Council of Entrepreneurs at the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine by the second Yanukovich's government (2006-2007).

As for Y. Tymoshenko and her support to small and medium enterprises, her political force focused its attention on lobbying the abolition of the market tax. However, in the opinion of experts, local budgets would lose a part of earnings should the market tax be abolished. To cover the deficit, the Verkhovna Rada will probably have to abolish the fixed tax for entrepreneurs and to substitute it with the single tax, which will hit them in their pocket.

In view of principles of activity of the main political actors, high-ranking officials are expected to continue to support large export-oriented businesses. This support might imply various privileges and preferential treatment for their development under the motto of “investment attractiveness” (V. Yanukovych) or the substitution of privileges with a system of government subsidies (Y. Tymoshenko) granted according to corruption schemes.

Given backstage agreements between the two largest parliamentary factions, such “government support to business” will have nothing in common with the public-private partnership. The former might become an important component of the innovation policy and a serious weapon to combat corruption, whereas the latter is built on corruption principles.

The fact that the Verkhovna Rada postponed the entry into force of the anti-corruption package submitted by President V. Yushchenko from 1 January to 1 April (for the time being?..) indicates a desire of MPs to delay the beginning of the implementation of decisions restricting corruption opportunities of public servants and impeding the government to “manually” control the business.

C. Taxation and the regulatory policy

Experts are unanimous that the Ukrainian tax system is not an instrument for enhancing the country’s competitiveness and directly hampers the growth of activity of economic entities. It is mostly fiscal in nature, complicated, instable and contradictory. Expenses for the tax administration are too high, whereas the mechanism for customs and tariff regulation does not offer an opportunity to promptly respond changes on the world market and in the structure of Ukraine’s economy.

This entails the evasion of taxes, high budget arrears of the VAT reimbursement and the unequally distributed tax burden.

For the time being, there are, at least, two formalized proposals for reforming the tax and regulatory policies.

V. Yanukovych team suggests reducing the tax burden on the corporate sector of economy, which will mean the shift of the tax burden on the shoulders of natural persons. In other words, the large business will pay fewer taxes at the expense of the increase/retention of the tax pressure on employees.

The innovation and investment model of economy, as seen by the Party of Regions, also provides for privileges for the VAT and the company tax, the reanimation of free economic zones and industrial parks. It has to be reminded that the draft Tax Code developed by the second Yanukovych’s government provided for privileges (to be granted according to government decisions) for the large business that were applied before 2005: privileges to free economic zones, industrial parks, enterprises applying energy-saving technologies, chemical enterprises, enterprises importing technological equipment and others.

Such the system will apparently enable businesses close to power to get profit at the expense of the state and, in the long run, at the expense of citizens. This will help destroy the free competition because enterprises, loyal to the government, will obtain additional competitive advantages due to various benefits and, as a result, will continue to oust the medium business that does not have access to such privileges. This will also feed political corruption as businessmen, who will get privileges, will have to repay favors.

As far as the small business is concerned, the draft Tax Code of 2007 restricts the circle of entities, which have the right to shift to the simplified taxation system (this is prohibited for 20 categories of businessmen and enterprises with annual turnover over UAH 300,000).

Directions of the tax system reform “from Tymoshenko” are clear from the Strategy of Reforming the Tax System promulgated by the Ministry of Finance on 24 July, 2008 and approved by the Cabinet resolution No. 1612-p of 23 December, 2009, which has to serve as a basis for the Tax Code.

The key provisions of the document include the abolition of all tax privileges (explained by the WTO requirements) and the simplified tax regime for the small business (instead, other forms of the government support are suggested – the exemption from record-keeping and the application of a simplified accounting system). Furthermore, the profit tax will be imposed on insurance companies, securities brokers and joint investment institutions.

The draft provides to reduce the profit tax in 2011-2013 on condition that “budget receipts are sufficient” though precise figures are not indicated. The Strategy also mentions the gradual approximation of the tax burden of natural persons (the income tax amounts to 15%) and that of legal entities (25%).

The rates of excise duty on tobacco and alcohol will only increase. Excise duty will also be imposed on natural gas and electric power. The rates of natural resource rent will grow as well – companies will have to pay it, irrespective of their mineral production and even only for the right to exploit lands.

It is generally apprehended that should the system of government support be changed, big enterprises might easily adapt themselves to new conditions and might enjoy legal opportunities of the tax optimization. Experience of, say, subsidizing agrarians proves 7% of agricultural farms got $\frac{3}{4}$ of all subsidies and subventions.

Also, the Ministry of Finance suggests to apply the real estate tax and to give the State Taxation Administration the right to calculate taxes using indirect methods to find hidden incomes (the respective right has already been legally entrenched but is not applied due to the absence of a special procedure that has to be enshrined in a by-law act).

Liberal Ukrainian politicians come out for the timely reimbursement of the VAT and insist on the bringing the value added taxation system in line with European standards.

Besides, they propose to calculate and to pay the VAT only in transactions between VAT payers and non-payers, i.e. in the ultimate consumption. In the opinion of experts, such the approach will help retain positive feature of the tax (its indirect nature, neutrality for economy and orientation towards the ultimate consumer). Together with the reduction of the VAT rate, the tax will be favorable for both the ultimate consumer and enterprises paying the VAT. This will also help eliminate the tax credit on the VAT reimbursement, i.e. sources of corruption linked to the VAT.

Of special note is the fact that having concepts of the tax system reform in their arsenals, neither Tymoshenko nor Yanukovich made them important parts of their platforms. This evidences **the taxation and regulatory policy reforms are at the periphery of attention of their political forces.**

What the draft Tax Code developed by Yanukovich's second government and the Tax Reform Strategy approved by Tymoshenko's Cabinet have in common is **the absence of ideology of radical changes in the tax administration system and the liberalization of the taxation system as such.**

These political forces also attempt to evade the topic of the radical market deregulation. Practical activities of Yanukovich and, especially, Tymoshenko's Cabinets demonstrate their efforts to launch new tools for the market regulation and to increase pressure on business by "mobilizing" tax revenues and raising the excise duty on some goods.

Taking the inclination of Tymoshenko and Yanukovich to populism into account, it has to be expected that the deficient tax system and the absence of a clear regulatory policy will pose serious risks to the business in Ukraine in the medium-term period.

D. The land issue

The land remains the only property, the large share of which is still out of the legal market. Notwithstanding the formal recognition of the private property by the government, the land is still a commodity circulated under shadow schemes because the moratorium on the sale of agricultural lands is retained. Speculative turnover of lands is growing. According to experts, 40-45% of agricultural output circulates in the shadow, payment in kind still exists in the rural area and barter transactions are widespread.

Analysis of the structure of risks of property in land proves they are mostly concentrated in the law influenced by large land owners disinterested to create the market for lands. During the crisis, actors of the land market were among lobbyists of the moratorium because today, it would be difficult, even for big companies, to accumulate working assets for the purchase of lands even at the lowest price (\$500/hectare). All the more so as large agricultural holdings concluded land tenure contracts for 10-15 years.

Populism of left-wing politicians and activities of agrarian lobbies are the main reasons that pose a key obstacle on the path to a civilized land market as the moratorium on the sale of agricultural lands is constantly prolonged.

The Land Code of Ukraine, to which the Verkhovna Rada refers to prolong the moratorium on the sale of agricultural lands, rules the moratorium should be abolished after the coming of the laws on the Land Cadastre and on the land market into effect. Nevertheless, on 15 September and on 18 November, 2009, the Verkhovna Rada voted down the bills "On the Land Market" and "On the National Land Cadastre". Even given the adoption of necessary laws, it will take the land cadastre system over two years to start working. It is necessary not only to develop index cadastre maps for the whole territory but also to set up an information system with the further input of all necessary information.

The absence of the land market impedes the inflow of investment. The EBRD alone is ready to invest some EURO 200 million in the development of the Ukrainian agricultural sector but denies doing this unless the moratorium on the purchase/sale of agricultural lands is abolished.

Numerous difficulties exist concerning the issue of public documents certifying the right in land property. The determined term has been prolonged since the end of the last year due to, among other things, the inability of structures of the State Committee for Land Resources to work in a civilized way. This gave experts grounds to believe the old system of land relations should be destroyed and substituted with a new civilized one.

In Ukrainian politics, the position of opponents to the transition to the legal land market is dominant (whatever reasons they have). Y. Tymoshenko and V. Yanukovych support the retention of the moratorium and ensure the lion's share of votes in respective decision-making in the Verkhovna Rada.

Over 5 years, V. Yushchenko has tried to affect the acceleration of the process of shaping the land market. Yet, a system of mechanisms, which would ensure the transparent transfer of lands and legally protect owners of land shares, has never been created. This happened, first of all, because of the alignment of forces in parliament.

There are all reasons to believe the land issue will remain the object of political bargaining and a means of mobilizing the voters. Possible accords between the PR and BYuT will end in the regulatory prolongation of the moratorium. Agreements of supporters of the land market with any of the largest parliamentary factions will not enhance the process of legitimating the land market. Since February, the President, whose veto on the prolongation of the moratorium has been overridden for years, will probably be not interested to radically change the situation.

The last prolongation of the moratorium (until 2012) evidences MPs are not going to pass "land" bills in the near future. And even if the necessary bills are adopted, the Verkhovna Rada would not hasten to abolish the moratorium on the sale of agricultural lands. This means investment in land (both in small land plots for individual use and in large lands for construction etc.) remains too risky.

EXPECTATIONS LINKED TO THE POST-ELECTION PERIOD

Experts say there is no readiness for positive changes. None of respondents marked in the questionnaire "The political struggle will not affect the country's socio-economic stability" (see data of the survey on "Impact of the Presidential Campaign in Ukraine on the Political Stability. Assessment of Corruption in Elections").

In the area of politics, attention is focused on the stability of the organization of the work of the legislature, the evaluation of political preconditions and legal grounds for the early termination of parliamentary powers and the holding of the special elections to the Verkhovna Rada in 2010. 17 out of 21 polled experts (80.9%) are inclined to think a new political reality will be shaped as a result of the presidential campaign, which will create grounds for the Verkhovna Rada elections in 2010. Yet, the dissolution of parliament will mean the need for new actors and will trigger new conflicts, which, in their turn, will be aggravated by different visions on the political system structure. Hence, the authors guess political elites will most likely look for a format of mutually beneficial cooperation and attempt to resolve the conflict of interests by means of the termination of parliamentary powers in the last turn. Political principles of a winner of the presidential elections will be crucial for a more precise long-term forecast on this matter.

Experts were almost unanimous concerning a possibility of the failure to approve the national budget until 1 April. 19 respondents (90.0%) share the above opinion. About ½ of pollsters

(47.6%) do not exclude a 10 % growth of inflation within the 1st quarter (in the 1st quarter of 2009, this indicator constituted 5.8%, in 2008 – 9.7%). Terms of the renewal of cooperation with the IMF will serve as an important indicator for the reduction of inflation risks.

Only 3 experts (14%) expect protest actions of citizens in 2010 as a result of the deterioration of the socio-economic situation. The UCIPR confirms the absence of motives for protest actions, notwithstanding a decrease in the cost-of-living and purchasing power of the population in general.

Some respondents (14.3% or 3 pollsters) anticipate “re-privatization” processes in the area of large capital after the presidential elections.

Approximately ½ of respondents (11 persons or 52.3%), including the authors of this document, are sure the public administration system might be imbalanced because of personnel changes as a part of political agreements made in the course of the electoral campaign.

In the short-term period, Ukraine’s foreign political priorities will not change after the elections. However, 6 experts (28%) deem the course towards the Euro-integration might be impeded in the long-term period.

POLITICAL STABILITY FORECAST

The medium- and long-term forecasts are unfavorable.

The main factors of political risks–

Polarized politics,
High level of the “human factor” in decision-making,
Instable political ties,
Voluntarism in decision-making,
Absence of consensus of political elites on reform goals and directions,
Closed decision-making in the interests of decision-making parties,
Disregard of procedures and the need for their recognition,
Unpredictable decisions,
Interference of the government with corporations,
Very high level of corruption

– will be retained.

INFORMATION ABOUT THE UCIPR PROJECT ON POLITICAL RISK ASSESSMENT

In 2008, having many-year experience of analysis of political processes and activity of political system institutions, the Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research (UCIPR) launched a new project linked to the identification of factors of political risks in Ukraine.

In the context of goals of this project, *a political risk* means tendencies that provoke uncertainty in the process of political and governmental decision-making and impede planning of actions on the country's markets. Political risks grow from political relations, i.e. relation concerning power and property, lie in the area of political decision-making and influence positions of agents in other areas. The term "political risk" does not coincide, by its volume, with the term "political stability" and concerns action/inaction of the government that rapidly changes conditions of work of economic agents on markets and adversely affects positions of different social groups. Political instability is viewed as an element of the structure of political risks.

The project *objective*: to forecast, on a basis of political risk assessment in Ukraine, a probability of the retention of their impact in the short- and medium-term period.

The *subject*: to evaluate the placing and correlation of groups of political influence both inside and outside the country and to analyze proposals of these groups.

The methodology: expert survey (questionnaire poll) concerning assessment of impact of the determined factors, monitoring of decisions and draft decisions of national authorities in Ukraine and abroad (that relate to Ukraine), monitoring of decision-making procedures and assessment of positions of groups of political influence.

Assessments are regularly revised.

The project is implemented by the UCIPR Politics Division.

Division Head – Svitlana Kononchuk; Project Expert – Ihor Nemchynov, Candidate of Philosophy.

Expert survey – Svitlana Gorobchyshyna